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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Barclay Bennett's judgment of convictions and sentence for 
possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings 
On September 30, 2011, Mr. Bennett was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), a felony, in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(l) as well as 
being a persistent violator pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2514. R. 30-31. The State alleged that 
on or about that same day, Mr. Bennett "did knowingly and unlawfully possess a controlled 
substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance .... " Id. On October 
3, 2011, the Kootenai County Public Defender was appointed to represent Mr. Barclay. R. 36. A 
preliminary hearing was then held on October 13, 2011. R. 40-47. At the conclusion of that 
hearing the Honorable Clark Peterson found there was sufficient cause to believe Mr. Bennett 
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance and ordered Mr. Bennett bound over to the 
District Court. R. 47. An Information was subsequently filed and in addition to the felony 
possession of a controlled substance charge and the persistent violator allegation, the Information 
filed on October 19, 2011, also charged Mr. Bennett with possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
misdemeanor, in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2734A. 
Mr. Bennett entered pleas of not guilty before the district court. R. 57-60. On June 22, 
2012, an Amended Information was filed with the only substantive change relating to the 
previous convictions to be considered for the persistent violator allegation. Following a series of 
continuances as well as the assignment of a conflict public defender, a jury trial was eventually 
scheduled to commence September 12, 2011. R. 119. 
At trial the State called five witnesses. Testifying first was Sergeant Jonathon Brandel 
with the Kootenai County Sheriffs Department. Transcript on Appeal ("Tr."), p. 16, ln. 15 - p. 
17, ln. 10. On September 29, 2011, Sgt. Brandel began a graveyard shift at 10:00 p.m. that 
would end at 8:00 a.m. the following morning. Tr. p. 19, Ins. 11-16. At midnight that evening 
he arrived at a residence along with Deputy Ryan Miller and Deputy Erik Hedlund. Tr. p. 19, ln. 
21 - p. 20, ln. 16. Upon arriving at the residence Sgt. Brandel and Deputy Miller entered the 
residence, went upstairs, and knocked on a bedroom door. Tr. p. 20, Ins. 21-24. Through the 
closed door Sgt. Brandel called out for "Barclay." Tr. p. 21, Ins. 7-8. Hearing a response, Sgt. 
Brandel identified himself as being with the Sherifrs department and ordered the person inside 
the bedroom to come to the door. Tr. p. 21, Ins. 8-9. Hearing no further response from the 
bedroom's occupants, law enforcement pushed the door open and entered the bedroom. Tr. p. 
21, Ins. 17-19. 
Upon entering, Sgt. Brandel was able to note the room was cluttered and lived in. Tr. p. 
22, Ins. 9-22. He described the furniture in the room as consisting of a night stand with a 
television, dresser, bed, and perhaps a chair. Tr. p. 23, ln. 17 - p. 24, ln. 6. He also explained 
that Mr. Bennett and a woman were both standing. Tr. p. 24, Ins. 15 - 17. Mr. Bennett was near 
an open dresser with his back to law enforcement with his hands at his waist. Tr. p. 25, Ins. 12-
15; Tr. p. 35, Ins. 11-16. Bree Larson, the woman in room with Mr. Bennett, was standing 
similarly with her back to law enforcement at the opposite end of the bed. Tr. p. 35, In. 20 - p. 
36, ln. 4. Responding to Sgt. Brandel's command, Mr. Bennett immediately showed his hands to 
law enforcement and was handcuffed. Tr. p. 25, ln. 19 - p. 26, ln. 6; Tr. p. 35, Ins. 17-19. 
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Sgt. Brandel then handed Mr. Bennett off to Deputy Miller. Tr. p. 27, Ins. 13-14. Sgt. 
Brandel then glanced at the open dresser drawer to make sure a weapon had not been placed 
inside and as he was turning away saw on top of the dresser, among some men's toiletries, a 
small plastic container containing what he recognized to be contraband. Tr. p. 27, In. 17 - p. 28, 
In. 8. Sgt. Brandel picked up the container, examined it more closely, and believing the 
substance was methamphetamine, handed the clear plastic container to Deputy Miller. Tr. p. 29, 
In. 17 - p. 31, In. 6. Sgt. Brandel further testified that photographs of the bedroom were never 
taken and a witness statement was not collected from Ms. Larson. Tr. p. 39, Ins. 15 - 16; Tr. p. 
40, Ins. 9-11. 
The State's second witness was Deputy Ryan Miller. Deputy Miller testified on the night 
in question he and Sgt. Brandel entered the residence, walked upstairs to a bedroom, and began 
knocking on the bedroom door. Tr. p. 49, In. 9 - p. 50, In. 19. After several seconds he and Sgt. 
Brandel entered the bedroom and observed a female standing to the left of the bed and a male 
standing to the right of the bed. Tr. p. 50, In. 19 - p. 51, In. 3. Deputy Miller approached the 
female who was facing away from him. Tr. p. 51, Ins. 15-24. Because he was initially unable to 
see the female's hands Deputy Miller believed he drew his taser. Tr. p. 51, Ins. 18-25. Deputy 
Miller also explained that he was wearing a video camera at the time and the recording was 
played for the jury. Tr. p. 52, In. 1 - p. 53, In. 22. 
Deputy Miller also testified that while they were in the bedroom Sgt. Brandel handed him 
a clear plastic container that contained a rock-like crystalline substance. Tr. p. 54, In. 21 - p. 55, 
In. 5. The first time he saw the plastic container it was in Sgt. Brandel's hand. Tr. p. 62, Ins. 2-4. 
Deputy Miller explained that he initially put the plastic container in his pants pocket, then in the 
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trunk of his patrol car, and then ultimately in an evidence locker at the sheriff's department. Tr. 
p. 55, In. 16 - p. 56, In. 11. Deputy Miller testified that he was the one who requested that the 
substance in the plastic container be tested for methamphetamine but that no other tests were 
ordered. Tr. p. 58, In. 19 - p. 59, In. 7. 
The State's third witness was David Sincerbeaux, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State 
Police. Tr. p. 67, In. 19 - p. 68, In. 4. Mr. Sincerbeaux explained the work he does at the 
laboratory and the process of testing controlled substances, and ultimately testified that it was his 
opinion that the contents of the plastic container at issue was methamphetamine. Tr. p. 76, In. 4. 
Mr. Sincerbeaux also testified that the plastic container was not tested for fingerprints or DNA, 
and that he could not say whose methamphetamine was in the plastic container. Tr. p. 78, Ins. 8-
19. 
The State then recalled Sgt. Brandel who opined that testing the plastic container for 
fingerprints or DNA was not necessary because he believed Mr. Bennett was the one who 
possessed the methamphetamine. Tr. p. 80, In. 2 - p. 84, In. 18. 
William Bailey was the State's final witness. In September 2011 he resided at the house 
at issue in this case and lived there with his twelve year old daughter and his daughter's mother. 
Tr. p. 85, In. 20 - p. 86, In. 8. He explained that towards the end of September he allowed Mr. 
Bennett, a friend of his, to stay in his daughter's bedroom as Mr. Bennett needed a place to stay 
for a few days. Tr. p. 86, In. 14 - p. 87, In. 3; Tr. p. 89, Ins. 18-20. Mr. Bailey testified that he 
has regular access to his daughter's bedroom because he will clean it up or go in there for normal 
parent-like reasons. Tr. p. 87, Ins. 6-10. Mr. Bailey had never seen the plastic container at issue. 
Tr. p. 88, Ins. 2-3. Mr. Bailey also testified that he has let others stay in his daughter's room on 
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prior occasions, including a gentlemen whom Mr. Bailey understands to be a user and cook of 
methamphetamine. The State then rested. Tr. p. 96, ln. 25 - p. 97, ln. 1. 
Counsel for Mr. Bennett moved the trial court for an order of acquittal pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29. Tr. p. 97, ln. 3 - p. 101, ln. 23. Drawing the trial court's attention to much of 
the jurisprudence on construction possession, including State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 735 P.2d 
1087 (Ct. App. 1987) and State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537,861 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1993), 
counsel emphasized that the Court of Appeals has routinely held that mere proximity to a 
controlled substance does not establish constructive possession. Id. In a case such as this where 
there are two occupants to a bedroom the State must present additional evidence supporting the 
inference that Mr. Bennett knew and had control of the methamphetamine. Id. 
In response the State argued Mr. Bennett's proximity to the methamphetamine as well as 
the methamphetamine's proximity to the men's toiletry items allows for a reasonable inference 
that Mr. Bennett possessed the methamphetamine. Tr. p. 102, Ins. 1-11. The State also pointed 
out that Mr. Bailey, the lessee of the home, had routine access to the bedroom and had never seen 
the plastic container before. Tr. p. 102, Ins. 15-21. 
The trial court denied Mr. Bennett's motion stating it "believes there is enough evidence 
from which a reasonable jury, by implication, could find the toiletries were Mr. Bennett's. It is 
the ultimate issue in the case." Tr. p. 104, Ins. 22-25. 
The defense did not put on a case. Tr. p. 105, Ins. 1-3. The trial court then took up the 
issue of jury instructions. Mr. Bennett submitted three proposed jury instructions relating to 
constructive possession. R. 121-126. The first proposed jury instruction read: 
You many not infer a finding of possession from the mere fact that a 
defendant occupied, with another or others, the home in which illegal drugs were 
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found. The evidence must establish that the charged defendant, individually, 
knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised control over them. Guilt by 
association is not sufficient. 
R. 121-122. Mr. Bennett even proposed striking the last sentence of the proposed jury 
instruction. Supplement to Transcript on Appeal, p. 101, Ins. 14-15. Nevertheless, the trial court 
refused to give this instruction indicating that it was covered by other instructions. R. 121. 
Mr. Bennett's second proposed instruction relating to constructive possession read: 
When several people occupy the same place where contraband has been 
found, mere proximity to the contraband, even coupled with a defendant's 
knowledge of the contraband, is not sufficient in itself to show control. 
R. 123-124. The trial court refused to give this instruction indicating that it also was covered by 
other instructions. R. 123. 
Mr. Bennett's third proposed instruction relating to constructive possession read: 
You may not infer a finding of possession from the mere fact that a 
defendant was visiting the home in which illegal drugs were found. The evidence 
must establish that the charged defendant, individually, knew of the illegal drugs 
and that he exercised control over it. Guilt by association is not sufficient. 
R. 125-126. Again, the trial court refused to give this instruction indicating that it was covered 
by other instructions. R. 125. Instead the trial court used the Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 
421. R. 165. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty for both possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 179-180; Tr. p. 109, Ins. 8-16. Mr. Bennett subsequently 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a persistent violator. Tr. p. 113, In. 24 - p. 114, In. 8. 
Mr. Bennett then filed a Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and a Motion for New 
Trial asserting that the jury was not properly instructed on the applicable law at trial. R. 181-184. 
Briefs in support of each motion were filed shortly thereafter. R. 185-198. In his Brief in 
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Support of Motion for Acquittal Mr. Bennett further set forth and examined the law of 
constructive possession in Idaho and argued the State failed to present sufficient evidence of Mr. 
Bennett's knowledge and control of the methamphetamine. R. 189. In his Brief in Support of 
Motion for a New Trial Mr. Bennett argued the trial court erred by not giving one of Mr. 
Bennett's requested instructions regarding constructive possession since they were supported by 
the evidence of the case, correct statements of the law, and were not adequately covered by the 
other jury instructions. R. 191-195.1 
The State filed a Brief Opposing Defendant's Motion for Acquittal (R. 217-222), arguing 
sufficient circumstantial evidence existed which could be reasonably relied upon by a jury to find 
Mr. Bennett guilty of both counts, as well as a Brief Opposing Defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial (R. 209-216), arguing the instruction given by the trial court regarding constructive 
possession "adequately state[ d] the law and no further instruction is necessary to explain 
constructive possession." Mr. Bennett filed both a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for 
Acquittal (R. 227-231) and a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for New Trial. R. 221-226. 
Both parties declined further argument at a hearing held on November 19, 2012 (R. 232; 
Tr. p. 120, Ins. 1-25) and the trial court subsequently issued a written decision denying Mr. 
Bennett's Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial. R. 233-237. In 
denying Mr. Bennett's request for a new trial the trial court mistakenly cited to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29(c), instead ofldaho Criminal Rule 34, and concluded "[n]o further instruction was 
necessary beyond the approved statement of the law on construction possession" citing State v. 
1 Mr. Bennett also argued in his Brief in Support of Motion for a New Trial that his right 
to a fair trial was violated because the prosecuting attorney impermissibly shifted the burden of 
proof and engaged in unnecessary inflammatory tactics. R. 195-198. Mr. Bennett later withdrew 
this prosecutorial misconduct argument. R. 225. 
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Seitter, 127 Idaho 356,360, 900 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1995). R. 233-235. The trial court also 
addressed Mr. Bennett's assertion of prosecutorial misconduct even though Mr. Bennett 
withdrew this argument in his previously filed reply brief. R. 235-236. Finally, the trial court, 
again citing the wrong rule, this time referencing Idaho Criminal Rule 34 instead of the 
applicable Idaho Criminal Rule 29, denied Mr. Bennett's request for a judgment of acquittal 
stating Mr. Bennett "did not submit any additional argument or briefing regarding whether the 
evidence to convict him was sufficient." R. 236. Mr. Bennett filed a Motion to Reconsider 
Motion for Acquittal pointing out that he filed a Brief in Support of Motion for Acquittal on 
October 4, 2012, and a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Acquittal on November 9, 2012. R. 
238-239. 
At the time scheduled for Mr. Bennett's sentencing hearing the trial court first addressed 
Mr. Bennett's Motion to Reconsider Motion for Acquittal, stating: 
The question basically is whether there is sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury might conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Bennett did 
possess methamphetamine, that he knew it was methamphetamine, and he either 
possessed it or had the power to control it. And my recollection of the testimony 
in the trial was that when the officers entered the room, Mr. Bennett was standing 
in close proximity to a dresser. On top of that dresser were toiletries related to a 
male. The room was in fact the bedroom of an 11-year old girl, who was the 
daughter of the tenant in the premises; that the father of that child had allowed 
Mr. Bennett to use the room for a period of approximately two days; that over a 
substantial period of time that parent had been in and out of the room, had never 
seen any evidence of drug paraphernalia or drugs in the room. 
Further, he did not know - Mr. Walsh specifically asked the tenant 
whether he knew whether his daughter used drugs. The response, as I recall, was 
she has never been in trouble like of that kind. 
Further testimony was that Mr. Bennett was in close proximity to that 
dresser, not very far at all. And the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Mr. Bennett either physically possessed that - those drugs and that 
paraphernalia- the paraphernalia, as I recall, was the bag - or he had the power to 
exercise control. So based upon that and based upon the Merwin case 131 Idaho 
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642 at 644, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to convict, and the 
Court denies the motion to reconsider. 
Tr. p. 126, In. 17 - p. 127, In. 22; see also R. 241. 
Mr. Bennett was subsequently sentenced to a unified term of 9 years with 3 years 
determinate for possession of a methamphetamine and 30 days in jail for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. R. 244-24 7. After a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 
35 (R. 256-257) was filed, the trial court reduced the determinate portion of Mr. Bennett's 
sentence for possessing methamphetamine from 3 years to 2 years. R. 274-275; Augmentation to 
Transcript on Appeal, p. 12, Ins. 1-7. This timely appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the jury was properly instructed on the applicable law and if the district 
court erred in denying his motion for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
34. 
2. Whether the evidence against Mr. Bennett was sufficient to support the 
convictions and the district court erred in denying Mr. Bennett's motions for 
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Bennett was Harmed by the District Court's Error in Refusing to Give the 
Requested Jury Instructions Regarding Constructive Possession and by Denying His 
Motion for a New Trial 
1. One of Mr. Bennett's three requested jury instructions should have been 
given to the jury 
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which appellate 
courts exercise free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P .2d 691, 694 ( 1992). Trial 
courts must instruct the jury on all matters of law necessary for the jury's information in criminal 
cases. J.C. § 19-2132. Courts must instruct on the rules of law that are material to the 
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determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,710,215 
P.3d 414,430 (2009); State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480,483, 974 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Ct. App. 1999). 
"This necessarily includes instructions on the 'nature and elements of the crime charged and the 
essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted."' Severson, 14 7 
Idaho at 710,215 P.3d at 430 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 
P.3d 920,922 (Ct. App. 2004)); State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267,275,506 P.2d 1340, 1348 (1973); 
State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 75-76, 88 P.2d 493,496 (1939); State v. Brown, 130 Idaho 389, 
391,941 P.2d 361, 363 (Ct. App. 1997). Each party is permitted to request specific instructions, 
but requested instructions need be given only if they are "correct and pertinent." LC.§ 19-2132. 
A proposed instruction is not correct and pertinent if it is an erroneous statement of the law, 
adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by a reasonable view of the trial 
evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State v. Olsen, 103 
Idaho 278,285,647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982); State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 43-44, 966 P.2d 33, 
43-44 (Ct. App. 1998). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a 
whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 
Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993). It is reversible error when the instructions 
misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the instructions. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 
310,955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). 
At trial there was no direct evidence linking Mr. Bennett to the methamphetamine or 
paraphernalia. Rather, the State's case was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. 
Because the methamphetamine was not found in Mr. Bennett's actual possession, the State was 
required to establish constructive possession. In order to prove constructive possession the State 
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must show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bennett had both knowledge and control of the 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 778, 735 P.2d 1087, 1089 
(Ct. App. 1987). Nevertheless, constructive possession may be joint or exclusive. State v. 
Randles, 117 Idaho 344,347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990). 
The State believed Mr. Bennett possessed the methamphetamine at issue because when 
law enforcement entered the bedroom he was standing in close proximity to the dresser which the 
methamphetamine was found on top of and amongst some mens toiletries. Importantly however, 
Mr. Bennett was not the sole occupant of the bedroom when the methamphetamine was found by 
law enforcement - a woman was also in the bedroom. Accordingly, the State was required to 
prove Mr. Bennett individually, knew of the methamphetamine and that he exercised dominion 
over it. State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885, 771 P.2d 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1989). "It is 
fundamental to our system of criminal law that guilt is individual." Delgado v. United States, 
327 F.2d 641,642 (9th Cir. 1964). Guilt by association simply is not sufficient. State v. Vinton, 
110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, when more than one person has 
access to or occupies the place where controlled substances are found "[m]ere proximity cannot 
establish constructive possession." Garza, 112 Idaho at 778, 735 P.2d at 1089; State v. Maland, 
124 Idaho 537,542, 861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Accordingly, Mr. Bennett requested a jury instruction based upon his theory of the case -
that mere proximity cannot establish constructive possession. Mr. Bennett submitted three 
proposed jury instructions on the subject. R. 121-126. Arguably, the best of these instructions 
was Mr. Bennett's second proposed instruction which read: 
When several people occupy the same place where contraband has been found, 
mere proximity to the contraband, even coupled with a defendant's knowledge of the 
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contraband, is not sufficient in itself to show control. 
R. 123-124. To begin with, this is an accurate statement of the law. Besides substituting 
"defendant" for "accused," this jury instruction is verbatim from State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 
542,861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Secondly, the concept that proximity alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction when 
more than one person occupies or has access to the methamphetamine was not covered by other 
instructions. The trial court did instruct the jury that Mr. Bennett must have "possessed" the 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. R. 162 & 163. And as noted above, the trial court 
also included the stock instruction defining possession, Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 421. R. 
165. However, contrary to the trial court's notation that the content of Mr. Bennett's second 
proposed instruction was already "covered," neither of the trial court's instructions touched on or 
addressed Mr. Bennett's theory of defense - that proximity alone is not sufficient. Even viewing 
the jury instructions as a whole, there is absolutely no mention or reference to this accurate 
statement of the law. 
Third, a reasonable view of the evidence supports giving Mr. Bennett's second proposed 
jury instruction. Mr. Bennett was not observed directly possessing the methamphetamine or 
paraphernalia nor did Mr. Bennett ever admit to possessing either one. Instead he, along with a 
woman, was found in a bedroom in close proximity to the contraband. The trial court itself 
characterized this as a case in which Mr. Bennett was found in "proximity" of the contraband. 
See Tr. p. 126, In. 17 - p. 127, In. 22. 
Because Mr. Bennett's second proposed jury instruction was an accurate statement of 
law, was not adequately covered by other instructions, and yet was supported by the evidence at 
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trial, the trial court erred in denying his request. Mr. Bennett is entitled to have the jury 
instructed upon the "essential legal principles applicable to the evidence" produced at his trial. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 710,215 P.3d at 430. His second proposed jury instruction was correct 
and pertinent and it was error for the district court to not give the instruction. 
2. The Court erred in denying Mr. Bennett's Motion for a New Trial 
Following the jury's guilty verdicts Mr. Bennett filed a Motion for a New Trial pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 34 arguing, similarly to the argument above, that the jury was improperly 
and insufficiently instructed on the law. For the sake of brevity the above argument will not be 
repeated here. However, for those same reasons, the Court's denial of Mr. Bennett's motion was 
in error. 
Additionally, in its written decision denying Mr. Bennett's motion the trial court held that 
Mr. Bennett's proposed instructions regarding proximity were not warranted because the trial 
court gave ICJI 421, possession defined, which the trial court referenced as the "approved 
instruction on constructive possession" and cited State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 360, 900 P.2d 
1367, 1371 (1995) which stated "[n]o further instruction was necessary beyond the approved 
statement of the law on constructive possession." Mr. Bennett acknowledges an annotation to 
ICJI 421, citing Seitter, states "[t]here is no need to attempt to distinguish further between actual 
possession and constructive possession and sole and joint possession." ICJI 421. The trial 
court's reliance upon this comment to ICJI 421 and Seitter were misplaced however, especially 
in a case such as this where there was the risk that the jury could improperly infer Mr. Bennett 
possessed contraband merely because of his proximity to it. 
In Seitter, law enforcement executed a search warrant upon an unoccupied clubhouse for 
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a local motorcycle club. State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 357, 900 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1995). A bag 
with methamphetamine was found hidden in the closet of the bedroom of the clubhouse. Id. 
Also found in the bedroom were two bags of an unidentified white powder located in a desk 
drawer. Id. Several other items in the bedroom appeared to belong to Mr. Seitter, the motorcycle 
club's president. Id. Mr. Seitter was convicted following a jury trial of possession of 
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and failure to affix a controlled substance tax stamp. 
Id. On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court held the introduction of evidence that two bags of white 
powder were found in the desk drawer was not relevant and therefore reversed Mr. Seitter' s 
convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 3 60, 900 P .2d at 13 71. 
As a matter of dictum the Seitter Court encouraged the trial court on remand to give the 
recently adopted ICJI 421 defining possession. The Seitter Court stated it "recently 
recommended that trial courts use this new instruction, unless a different instruction would more 
adequately, accurately, or clearly state the law." Id. (emphasis added). Though the comment to 
ICJI 421 suggests no further instructions should be given regarding constructive possession, 
Seitter did not prohibit further instruction on the law. To the contrary, it actually encourages 
different or further instruction on the law of constructive possession if the proposed instruction 
"more adequately, accurately, or clearly state[s] the law." 
This is precisely the issue in Mr. Bennett's case. Mr. Bennett proposed jury instructions, 
especially his second proposed jury instruction, was an accurate statement of law, was not 
covered by other instructions, and was supported by the evidence produced at trial. The Seiffert 
Court did not prohibit further clarification or instruction of the law and it certainly did not 
infringe upon Mr. Bennett's right to request a correct and pertinent instruction relating to an 
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essential legal principle at issue in this trial. As such, the trial court's reliance upon the dicta in 
Seiffert was in error and the trial court should have granted Mr. Bennett's Motion for a New 
Trial. 
B. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support Mr. Bennett's Convictions and 
Therefore the Trial Court Erred in Denying His Motions for a Judgment of 
Acquittal 
1. There was insufficient evidence to support Mr. Bennett's convictions for 
possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia 
An appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence is not unlimited. 
Nevertheless, a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will be overturned on appeal 
when there is not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that 
the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); 
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683,684,701 P.2d 303,304 (Ct. App. 1985). Appellate courts refrain 
from substituting their view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to 
be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,822 P.2d at 1001; Decker, 108 Idaho at 684, 701 P.2d at 304. On 
review, the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Knutson, 121 
Idaho at 104,822 P.2d at 1001; Decker, 108 Idaho at 684, 701 P.2d at 304. 
As set forth above in Section A, because the contraband at issue was not in Mr. Bennett's 
actual possession the State was required to prove constructive possession. As such, the State 
needed to prove Mr. Bennett had both knowledge and control of the methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia. State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 778, 735 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Constructive possession of contraband exists where a nexus between the accused and the 
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substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference the accused was not 
simply a bystander, but rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over 
the substance. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 58,966 P.2d 53, 58 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. 
Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644,647,945 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Ct. App. 1997). Knowledge and physical 
control of the contraband must be independently proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Seitter, 127 
Idaho at 360,900 P.2d at 1371; Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 58,966 P.2d at 58; Rozajewski, 130 
Idaho 644,647,945 P.2d 1390, 1393. 
Here, Mr. Bennett concedes, based upon the jurisprudence regarding constructive 
possession, there could be a reasonable inference that he had knowledge of the 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Sgt. Brandel testified that after taking Mr. Bennett into 
custody and he was turning away, Sgt. Brandel saw on top of the dresser, among some men's 
toiletries, a small plastic container containing what he recognized to be contraband. Idaho 
appellate courts have held that contraband found in plain view supports the inference that the 
defendant knew of the contraband's presence. See, e.g., Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 58-59, 966 P.2d 
at 58-59 (noting the fact that drugs and paraphernalia found in plain view support a finding the 
defendant knew of their existence); State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537,542, 861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
While the State did establish Mr. Bennett's proximity to the illegal contraband and 
arguably a reasonable inference supporting his knowledge of its existence, there is insufficient 
evidence suggesting Mr. Bennett had control over the methamphetamine and paraphernalia to 
establish constructive possession. Because Mr. Bennett was not the sole occupant of the 
bedroom the State was required to present sufficient evidence of circumstances supporting the 
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inference that he individually exercised control over the contraband. 
For instance, in Maland, a young man was charged with underage possession of alcohol. 
Id. at 539, 861 P.2d at 109. Maland, along with two other people, was found in a vehicle in a 
museum parking lot after hours. Id. Maland, who was the sole occupant of the back seat, was 
sitting next to an open Rainier beer case that contained both full and empty cans of beer. Id. No 
evidence was presented regarding the other two people or the ownership of the car. Id. No 
evidence was presented regarding whether Maland smelled of beer or had consumed any beer. 
Id. at 542, 861 P.2d at 112. The Court of Appeals, citing Garza, stated "[w]hen several people 
occupy the same place where contraband has been found, mere proximity to the contraband, even 
coupled with accused's knowledge of the contraband, is not sufficient in itself to show control." 
Id. Thus, even though Maland was closer to the beer than the other two occupants, the Court of 
Appeals reversed Maland's conviction stating, "[w]hile the state has shown Maland's proximity 
to the beer and knowledge of its presence, the state has not shown any other circumstances that 
would lead to the conclusion that he had control over the beer sufficient to establish constructive 
possession." Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986), a husband 
and wife were tried and convicted of manufacturing marijuana. The State presented a 
circumstantial case that tied both defendants to the marijuana and where it was discovered. Id. at 
834, 718 P.2d at 1272. Again, the Court of Appeals vacated the convictions of both the husband 
and wife because the State failed to adequately prove either the husband or wife individually 
exercised control over the marijuana. Id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that joint 
occupancy cases such as this create unique problems and therefore warned that "[ s ]uch cases 
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require careful police investigation before prosecution." Id. 
Maland and Vinton, where there are multiple people occupying the premises where illegal 
contraband is found, can be contrasted with Rozajewksi, where the defendant was the sole 
occupant. Rozajewski, driving alone, was stopped and arrested for driving under the influence. 
State v. Rozajewksi, 130 Idaho 644,645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). While searching 
the vehicle law enforcement found methamphetamine in the vehicle's glove compartment. Id. 
Rozajewski was convicted at trial for possession. Id. On appeal, Rozajewski, as did Maland and 
the Vintons, argued there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id. at 646, 945 
P.2d at 1392. The Court of Appeals affirmed Rozajewski's conviction however, noting he was 
the sole occupant in the car when he was stopped and that Rozajewski admittedly stored personal 
items in a large clear plastic bag which happened to also contain a smaller bag with 
methamphetamine inside. Id. at 647, 945 P.2d at 1393. As such, "there was evidence of 
circumstances to buttress an inference that Rozajewski knew of and exercised control over the 
methamphetamine found in his vehicle's glove compartment." Id. The nexus between 
Rozajewski and the methamphetamine was established. 
Similar to Rozajewksi, the Court of Appeals in State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 262 
P.3d 278 (Ct. App. 2011) recently held there was evidence sufficient to support a jury's guilty 
verdict based upon constructive possession. As in Rozajewksi, Betancourt was the sole occupant 
of the vehicle when he was stopped. Id. at 639,262 P.3d at 282. Betancourt also "had recently 
been sleeping and riding in the passenger's compartment where the methamphetamine was found, 
appeared nervous during his encounter with the officer, provided a confusing and incredible 
explanation for his whereabouts prior to the stop, and failed a blood test for methamphetamine." 
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Id. Based upon this evidence the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to find a nexus between Betancourt and the methamphetamine found in the 
vehicle to support a finding of constructive possession. Id. 
Here, as in Maland, Mr. Bennett was admittedly closer to the illegal contraband than his 
female companion when law enforcement entered the bedroom. However, the State failed to 
present any evidence beyond Mr. Bennett's proximity to the contraband. The State presented no 
evidence suggesting Mr. Bennett had used methamphetamine or that he was acting nervously. 
No evidence of any significance was presented about the bedrooms other occupant or her 
belongings. There was not even any evidence as to who owned the men's toiletries the 
methamphetamine was found near. When two or more people occupy the same place where 
contraband is found the State must prove enough that would lead to the conclusion that at least 
one of them individually had control of the contraband. 
Moreover, the cautionary words of the Vinton Court were ignored by law enforcement in 
this case. "Careful police investigation" cannot describe what occurred here. No witness 
statements were collected. The female occupant of the bedroom was not interviewed or 
searched. No photographs were taken. No fingerprint testing was done on the plastic container. 
Nothing was done to further corroborate law enforcement's belief that Mr. Bennett was the one 
who possessed the contraband. Nothing was done to adequately prove Mr. Bennett individually 
executed control over the contraband. And unlike Rozajewksi and Betancourt, Mr. Bennett was 
not the sole occupant where the illegal contraband was found. The only evidence presented to 
the jury in this regard was Mr. Bennett's proximity to the contraband and that the contraband was 
found near some mens toiletries. More is required. Mere proximity cannot establish constructive 
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possession. The evidence presented by the State does not constitute sufficient evidence to uphold 
a conviction in Idaho. Accordingly, Mr. Bennett's convictions should be reversed. 
2. The Court erred in denying Mr. Bennett's Motions for a Judgment of 
Acquittal 
On review, the determination of whether a trial court erred in denying a motion for 
judgment of acquittal is the same as a review regarding sufficiency of evidence. Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29 provides that on motion of the defendant, a trial court must order the entry of a judgment 
of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense. When reviewing 
an order denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, appellate courts examine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912-13, 908 
P.2d 1211, 1219-20 (1995). Evidence is sufficient if there is substantial evidence upon which a 
reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the 
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 
385,957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 
1001 (Ct. App. 1991 ). Appellate courts should not substitute their view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,822 P.2d at 1001; State v. 
Decker, 108 Idaho 683,684, 701 P.2d 303,304 (Ct. App. 1985). On review the evidence must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d 
at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P .2d at 1001. 
Because this Court's review regarding Mr. Bennett's motions for judgment of acquittal is 
the same as its review for sufficiency of evidence, the previously set forth argument as to why 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Bennett's convictions will not be repeated here. 
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However, for those same reasons the trial court was in error when it denied Mr. Bennett's motion 
at the end of the State's case in chief as well as his post-trial Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bennett respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgments of conviction and 
sentences. 
Respectfully submitted this _J_ day of January, 2014. 
wnson 
or Barclay Bennett 
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